



# FRAMEWORK TO COUNTER DRUG TRAFFICKING AND OTHER ILLCIT THREAT NETWORKS

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THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
FRAMEWORK TO COUNTER DRUG  
TRAFFICKING AND  
OTHER ILLICIT THREAT NETWORKS

*May 2019*

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UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
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Many of our nation's adversaries, including nation-states, non-state actors, and terrorist groups, depend on proceeds generated from drug trafficking and other illicit activities to fund their operations. Since the Department of Defense published its Counternarcotics and Global Threats Strategy in 2011, the links among threat networks engaged in illicit drug trafficking, transnational organized crime, criminal finance, and terrorist activities have multiplied and strengthened. Furthermore, we see collaboration between these networks and state actors who threaten U.S. national security.

This Framework to Counter Drug Trafficking and Other Illicit Threat Networks revises and renames the 2011 strategy to further focus the Department's efforts to counter networks engaged in global drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime. This document aligns with Executive Order 13773, "Enforcing Federal Law with Respect to Transnational Criminal Organizations and Preventing International Trafficking," and the Secretary of Defense's decision to accept the invitation of the Attorney General and other co-chairs to serve as an additional co-chair of the Threat Mitigation Working Group that implements Executive Order 13773.

This Framework provides foundational guidance for implementing the Department's policies, plans, and programs to counter illicit drug trafficking and other illicit networks that threaten U.S. national security interests. The Department seeks to strengthen collaboration among U.S. Government and international partners, build partner nation capabilities and capacities, and support our nation's security interests at home and abroad. These efforts, along with those of our partners, will help break the links between transnational criminal organizations, violent extremist organizations, and state and non-state adversaries who exploit these organizations to advance their own national interests at the expense of the safety of the American people.

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A photograph showing U.S. Navy service members on a boat during training. The soldiers are wearing camouflage uniforms and are equipped with rifles and communication gear. They are positioned on the deck of a green boat, with another boat visible in the background. The scene is set in a tropical environment with lush greenery and palm trees.

# I. Strategic Environment

U.S. Navy service members, attached to Coastal Riverine Squadron 2, conduct training with the Belize Special Boat Unit during Southern Partnership Station 2014. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Andrew Schneider/Released)

## *Introduction*

This *Framework to Counter Drug Trafficking and Other Illicit Threat Networks* outlines the Department of Defense's role in addressing the persistent, low-intensity, but high-impact threats posed by drug trafficking and other illicit networks in order to reduce their threat to U.S. national security. It supports and complements other defense, diplomatic, and law enforcement guidance set forth in a series of mutually supporting national strategies, including: the *National Security Strategy*, *National Defense Strategy*, *National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS)*, *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime*, *National Strategy for Counterterrorism*, and other related strategies.<sup>1</sup>

In conjunction with other departments and agencies, the Department of Defense (DoD) supports the continuing national priority to identify, disrupt, and degrade those transnational criminal networks that pose the greatest threats to U.S. national security by targeting their infrastructure, depriving them of enabling means, and preventing the criminal facilitation of terrorist activities and the malign activities of adversary states. The task of identifying and targeting drug trafficking and other illicit threat networks is complex and requires close coordination among capable U.S. and international intelligence, military, and law enforcement partners.

The threat to U.S. national security posed by illicit drugs extends beyond traditional challenges and directly impacts public health and safety. Many of our nation's adversaries, including nation-states, non-state actors, and violent extremist organizations (VEOs), depend on proceeds generated from drug trafficking and other illicit activities to fund their operations. Some state and non-state actors influence, oversee, or directly control criminal enterprises. The increasing convergence of threat networks involved in illicit activities represents a growing, multilayered, and asymmetric challenge to U.S. national security.

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<sup>1</sup> Other relevant strategies include the Department of Defense Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (February 2013), the Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (June 2014), the Department of Defense Cyber Strategy (September 2018), National Strategy for Combating Wildlife Trafficking (February 2014), the U.S. Government's Combating Piracy Action Plan (June 2014), and the Department of State Five-Year Global Plan to Combat Emerging Synthetic Drug Trends (December 2018).

In Fiscal Year (FY) 2015, Congress amended Section 1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 1991<sup>2</sup> and Section 1022 of the NDAA for FY 2004<sup>3</sup> to provide DoD with

*“Transnational criminal organizations and subsidiary organizations, including transnational drug cartels, have spread throughout the Nation, threatening the safety of the United States and its citizens. These organizations derive revenue through widespread illegal conduct, including acts of violence and abuse that exhibit a wanton disregard for human life.”*

Donald J. Trump –  
President of the United States  
Executive Order  
February 9, 2017

expanded authorities to support other agencies’ efforts to counter not only drug trafficking, but also other forms of transnational organized crime (TOC). Section 1022 provides the Secretary of Defense with authority, under specified conditions, to use appropriations made available for counter-illicit drug trafficking (CIDT) activities to also support law enforcement agencies’ counterterrorism (CT) and counter-transnational organized crime (CTOC) activities that do not relate significantly to the illicit drug trade.

The NDAA for FY 2017 repealed Section 1004 and codified the majority of Section 1004 authorities as Section 284 of Title 10, U.S. Code (*Support for Counterdrug Activities and Activities to Counter Transnational Organized Crime*). The NDAA for FY 2017 codified in Section 333 of Title 10, U.S. Code, the authority -- formerly in Section 1004 -- to provide support to foreign law enforcement agencies for CIDT and CTOC activities. Section 333, which is located in Chapter 16 (*Security Cooperation*) of Title 10, U.S. Code, is DoD’s global train-and-equip authority, which is used to build the capacity of foreign security forces. Chapter 16 makes the Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) responsible for the execution and administration of DoD security cooperation programs and activities, including train-and-equip programs under Section 333 with a CIDT or CTOC purpose. This change allows DoD to increase the focus of the counterdrug and counter

transnational organization crime program on applying other relevant DoD authorities and resources toward all-domain awareness, operational support, and intelligence analysis and information sharing.

On February 9, 2017, President Trump signed Executive Order (EO) 13773, *Enforcing Federal Law with Respect to Transnational Criminal Organizations and Preventing International Trafficking*. In EO 13773, the President directed the Threat Mitigation Working Group (TMWG) to direct and coordinate the whole-of-government strategic planning and strategic intelligence efforts to identify, interdict, disrupt, and dismantle transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). The Secretary of Defense accepted the invitation to become a co-chair of the TMWG on August 3, 2018, joining the Attorney General, the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Homeland Security.

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<sup>2</sup> Amended by Section 1012 of the NDAA for FY 2015.

<sup>3</sup> Amended by Section 1014 of the NDAA for FY 2015.

The Department’s statutory mission to serve as the single lead agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States remains a priority. By performing this mission, DoD helps deter, disrupt, and degrade potential threats before they reach the United States. DoD also supports U.S. Government and international efforts to target TCOs at their source, and builds international partnerships to prevent transnational threat networks from undermining sovereign governments, decreasing regional stability, and threatening the United States. While sustaining its global CIDT efforts, DoD is directing operational and fiscal resources toward efforts that support National Defense Strategy objectives to disrupt, degrade, and dismantle threat networks and VEOs that use proceeds generated from illicit activities to fuel insurgencies, contribute to regional instability, or enable acts of terrorism and the malign activities of adversary states.

With its updated statutory authorities, DoD may now support U.S. Government actions against a broader continuum of illicit threat networks. This includes a variety of criminal associations, including the trafficking of money, human trafficking, illicit financial flows, illegal trade in natural resources and wildlife, trade in illegal drugs and weapons, and other forms of illegal means as determined by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to statutory authority.<sup>4</sup>

## Global Trends

Drug trafficking and other illicit threat networks continue to pose a serious and persistent threat to the security, health, and safety of the American people. These threats undermine the ability of the nation to fulfill key responsibilities: guarantee the security of the nation’s citizens and the nation’s territory, promote economic prosperity, and prioritize assistance to partners that are aligned with U.S. interests. Illicit threat networks that include terrorists, criminals, proliferators, and adversary states are presenting unprecedented asymmetrical threats to U.S. interests at home and abroad. It is only through a unified effort with interagency and foreign partners that can we address this complex national security, law enforcement, and public health problem.

Transnational criminal organizations threaten U.S. interests by taking advantage of failed states or contested spaces; forging alliances with corrupt foreign government officials and some foreign intelligence services; destabilizing political, financial, and security institutions in fragile states; undermining competition in world strategic markets; and using cyber technologies and other methods to perpetrate sophisticated frauds. Whether carried out by nation-states, state proxies, terrorist groups, or non-aligned organizations, the criminal activities perpetrated by these networks

*“Profits from the illicit drug trade can constitute considerable financial incentives for organized criminal groups. For example, a recent UNODC study showed that the illicit proceeds of opiates smuggled along the Balkan route through Europe amounted to, on average, \$28 billion per year.”*

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)  
World Drug Report 2016


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<sup>4</sup> See Section 1022 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, as amended (10 U.S.C. 271 note).

transcend law enforcement, intelligence community, and other U.S. Government spheres of action.

Today’s criminal networks are fluid, striking new alliances with other networks around the world and engaging in a wide range of illicit activities, including support for terrorism and the malign activities of state adversaries and non-state actors. TCOs and their enterprises are connected and empowered by information systems technologies, making cyber-enabled crime a substantially more important concern. The cyber domain will further empower illicit threat actors as they capitalize on new opportunities for illicit activities in cyberspace and incorporate new technologies to improve their operations.

Although drugs are one of the most lucrative forms of illicit trafficking globally, with an annual global value between \$426 billion and \$652 billion, they are by no means the only form of revenue



for TCOs, VEOs, and state and non-state actors. (Figure 1). Illicit threat networks have diversified their portfolios beyond heroin and cocaine to trafficking in other illicit drugs, weapons, persons, wildlife, and illegally mined precious metals and gems. The Washington DC-based research and advisory organization Global Financial Integrity (GFI) estimates the value of transnational organized crime at \$1.6 trillion to \$2.2 trillion annually.

**Figure 1: Retail Value of Transnational Organized Crime**

The past 15 years have witnessed an unprecedented acceleration of globalization, horizontal diversification, and connectivity across illicit and licit networks, facilitated by rapid advancements in information, communication, and transportation technologies. While globalization has borne fruits, it has inadvertently enabled the growth of transnational criminal networks and their illicit enterprises. The licit networks of global supply chains, dynamic trade patterns, and integrated markets allow illicit networks to blend in more easily, making it more difficult for authorities to detect them and thwart their operations. This problem is compounded in areas with resource limitations, lacking the funds and time (and often the political will) to innovate in an effort to confront these networks.

The range of drugs and drug markets is expanding and diversifying as never before. Total global opium production jumped by 65 percent from 2016 to 2017, to 10,500 tons, easily the highest estimate recorded by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) since it started estimating global opium production at the beginning of the twenty-first century. A notable

increase has been seen in cocaine production as well; global cocaine manufacturing in 2016 reached its highest level ever: an estimated 1,410 tons. After falling during the period 2005–2013, global cocaine manufacturing rose by 56 percent during the period 2013–2016.

According to preliminary data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, more than 72,000 people in the United States died from drug overdoses in 2017—an all-time record, averaging nearly 200 a day. The sharp increase in drug overdose deaths since 2015 is fueled by a surge in the use of fentanyl and fentanyl analogues. Although the current opioid crisis has deservedly garnered significant attention, the methamphetamine threat remains prevalent, the cocaine threat to the United States appears to be rebounding, and new psychoactive substances (NPS) continue to pose a challenge.

The future trajectory of TCOs is disconcerting, as they seek to penetrate new markets with goods and services and expand their spheres of influence using corruption and violence. The objective of this *Framework* is to define and address the growing use of criminally motivated illicit networks by state and non-state threat actors as a component of broader national security threats and to provide guidance for DoD Components to develop plans, programs, and activities.

## Key Threats

The nation faces a complex set of threats to U.S. national security emanating from state and non-state actors. To varying degrees, these actors leverage criminal support infrastructure to advance their objectives. The last decade has seen unprecedented growth of interactivity and convergence among a wide range of illicit threat network actors, and the emergence of hybrid organizations that use methods characteristic of terrorists, criminals, and proxy groups.

**Drug trafficking.** Worldwide production of heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine is at record levels. U.S. mortality from potent synthetic opioids doubled in 2017, and synthetic opioids have become a key cause of U.S. drug deaths. Mexican criminal groups supply much of the heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine that crosses the U.S.-Mexico border. China-based suppliers ship fentanyl and fentanyl precursors to Mexico, Canada, and U.S.-based distributors or sell directly to consumers via the Darkweb. China and India are the primary sources of precursor chemicals necessary to produce

*“Making matters worse, Latin American armed groups are going transnational. Some of Brazil’s gangs, for example, are expanding their reach beyond Brazil. First Capital Command, or PCC, now Latin America’s most infamous drug faction, has operations in at least seven countries across South America. Groups hatched in the United States, the MS-13 and Barrio 18, have made El Salvador one of the world’s most violent countries measured by homicide rate. And the Colombian city of Medellin’s fragmented cartels, criminal gangs, rebel groups, and paramilitary organizations have metastasized from Mexico to Argentina. Likewise, outside of the Americas, in metropolises such as Cape Town, Lagos, and Karachi, gangs recruit child soldiers to fight their battles and service booming cross-border trade in drugs, minerals, and trafficked people.”*

Robert Muggah & John P. Sullivan  
The Coming Crime Wars  
Foreign Policy  
September 21, 2018


cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and synthetic opioids. In Afghanistan, the drug trade and opium production remain a critical funding stream for the Taliban and other illicit actors.

**Regional Threats.** Mexican TCOs remain the greatest criminal threat to the United States. The Sinaloa and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) are the most powerful of the nine major Mexican TCOs, both with global reach. In Central America, gangs and other regional illicit networks conduct illicit drug smuggling and weapons trafficking. Gang violence and other criminal activity corrupt police, military personnel, the judiciary, and other law enforcement agents despite police and judicial reforms. The Dominican Republic continues to grow as a key transshipment country for illicit drugs destined for the United States, where Dominican TCOs continue to expand operations. Although Colombia's peace agreement with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) was a historic step towards ending decades of civil conflict, Colombia now faces new security challenges with the fragmentation of Colombia's criminal landscape. Insurgent forces, former right-wing paramilitary groups, and other illegal armed groups work in concert or fight for control over Colombia's criminal underworld. In Africa, terrorists, insurgent forces, TCOs, and nation-state competitors pose a persistent threat across the continent. Illicit markets are growing across Africa to meet demand, including drugs, people, weapons, cigarettes, wildlife products, used cars, diamonds, and other precious minerals and metals. Terrorists such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), ISIS affiliates, al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram also engage in criminal activities, including extortion, kidnapping for ransom, and taxing illicit flows to fund their violent campaigns. Some government officials collude and conspire with criminal networks; this has helped foster illicit activities throughout the continent and connect them on a global scale. Piracy and other illicit maritime activities threaten development efforts, weaken state security, and rob states of resources required for greater economic growth and more effective governance.

**State Actors.** Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea utilize blended forms of global competition, including criminal and cyber means, to achieve their national objectives. Russian and other Eurasian TOC groups continue to thrive within and outside their borders, including in the United States. Russian President Putin has shown a capacity and willingness to utilize criminal means to achieve Russia's global objectives. China's semi-permissive legal environment continues to foment a growing global TOC hub, which allows Chinese criminal organizations and other international illicit networks to support criminal activities and extend Chinese influence. A growing body of open-source and law enforcement reflections indicates China's role in permitting or enabling illicit activities, including economic crimes, illicit drug trafficking, wildlife trafficking, and the illicit procurement of sensitive technologies.

To support its global objectives, North Korea employs a complex overseas financing and procurement system designed to raise the funds and materials North Korea needs for its regime security and weapons programs. These networks engage in schemes as diverse as cybercrime, military equipment sales, currency counterfeiting, illicit drug trafficking, and wildlife trafficking. Iran leverages a network of front companies, proxies, and individuals to conduct illicit activities on its behalf. Iran's main initiators include the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force, the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence, and Lebanese Hezbollah. All three use illicit activities, front companies, and cultural-religious centers as covers for their operations abroad to subvert sanctions, support terrorist groups, and conduct illicit procurement and proliferation activities.

**Crime-Terror-Insurgency Nexus.** The convergence of TCOs, terrorist organizations, and insurgent organizations reflects the symbiosis (Figure 2) of illicit activities, and has become a growing global security concern. Terrorist and insurgent groups such as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Taliban, al-Shabaab, and the FARC are among the non-state actors that leverage the use of violence and other illicit activities to undermine the security of the United States and other nations. Hezbollah is perhaps the best-organized and most business-savvy terrorist organization; it relies on global facilitators engaged in illicit drugs, arms, counterfeit trafficking, and money laundering for financing and support. ISIS and other illicit actors traffic in and consume amphetamine-based captagon and the opioid-like pain medication tramadol. Links between “low-level” criminality and terrorism exist around the world, including in Europe, where ISIS operatives established ties to the illicit underworld and the black market.



**Figure 2: The Convergence of Threat Networks**

**Criminal Enabling Networks.** Worldwide shipments of precursor chemicals used in the production of illicit drugs continue to pose a significant and direct threat to the United States. China and India are the primary sources for precursor chemicals. The volume of commercial precursor chemical shipments poses a tremendous challenge. Criminal networks rely on financial industry experts, both witting and unwitting, to facilitate corrupt transactions and to create the necessary infrastructure to pursue their illicit schemes, such as creating shell corporations, opening offshore bank accounts, and creating front businesses for their illegal activities and money laundering. Common methods used to move and launder illicit proceeds include bulk cash smuggling, Hawala networks, and trade-based money laundering.

Cybercriminals are expanding their global operations, even as law enforcement and foreign partners succeed in shutting down major dark web marketplaces. According to the 2018 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)/McAfee report, *Economic Impact of Cybercrime – No Slowing Down*, “cybercrime may now cost the world almost \$600 billion, or 0.8% of global GDP” The Darknet provides an environment for illicit trade in commodities such as heroin, cocaine, synthetic drugs, counterfeit currency, firearms, and protected or managed wildlife. Illicit goods purchased online via the Darknet or through open web vendors reach their customers predominantly through postal and parcel services. The line between criminal and nation-state activity has become increasingly blurred as states view cybercriminal tools as a relatively inexpensive and plausibly deniable means to enable their operations. Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean actors facilitate and take advantage of cyberspace for criminal purposes, in ways that also support those nations’ actions to challenge U.S. diplomatic and security efforts.

## Assumptions

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DoD developed this *Framework to Counter Drug Trafficking and Other Illicit Threat Networks* based on the following assumptions regarding the anticipated global security environment for the next five years:

- The United States will remain in an era of continuous competition among state, non-state, and individual actors who are willing to use violence and other means to achieve their political, financial, and ideological ends.
- Demand for illegal commodities, particularly illicit drugs, in the United States and other countries will continue to exist.
- Proceeds generated from illicit drug trafficking and other criminal activity will remain a key revenue source for threat networks.
- The United States will continue to face significant security consequences associated with weak, corrupt, or failing states, including mass atrocities, regional conflict spillover, and transnational organized crime.
- State adversaries will continue to use threat networks, including criminal and terrorist networks, to conduct, direct, and enable malign activities that advance their national interests.
- Foreign criminal and terrorist networks will continue to exploit weak states, under-governed territories, and ungoverned spaces, by leveraging global communications, logistics, legal, and financial structures, leading to further instability in vulnerable regions.
- DoD will continue to rely heavily on information and analysis obtained and shared with the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities and other partners to drive detection and monitoring operations and support law enforcement actions.
- Funding for CIDT and CTOC activities via the Counterdrug Central Transfer Account (CTA) will remain steady through the Future Years Defense Program 2020-2024.
- DoD will continue to conduct and fund train-and-equip activities supporting CIDT and CTOC objectives through security cooperation authorities and resources.





## II. Strategic Approach

Afghan Special Mission Wing Mi17 helicopters enabled partnered Afghan Special Police and coalition forces counterterrorism and counter-narcotics operations throughout Helmand province. (Photo courtesy of Australian Army)

*Vision – DoD helps disrupt and degrade drug trafficking and other illicit threat networks to a level that allows law enforcement agencies, local and regional security forces, or other elements of national power to manage the threat.*

Disrupting, degrading, and defeating terrorist networks and other violent extremist organizations (VEOs) are top DoD objectives. Whether they engage in acts of terrorism, insurgency, or transnational organized crime (TOC), these networks require money and materials to carry out operations. By denying these adversaries resources and access, the DoD can support partner efforts disrupt adversaries' activities and degrade their ability to operate, curtail organizational and territorial expansion, and hamper member recruitment efforts.

While sustaining its statutory drug detection and monitoring capabilities, and continuing to support law enforcement in global CIDT efforts, DoD will increasingly direct operational and fiscal resources toward efforts that support the disruption and degradation of state-sponsored or non-state actors, and threat networks engaged in TOC. DoD will place special emphasis on those criminal enterprises that use proceeds generated from illicit activities to fuel insurgencies, decrease regional stability, or support acts of terrorism. This *Framework* envisions an end-state where **drug trafficking and other illicit threat networks are disrupted and degraded to a level where they are detected and acted upon through law enforcement agencies, local and regional security forces, or other elements of national power.**

### *Priorities*

This *Framework to Counter Drug Trafficking and Other Illicit Threat Networks* is designed to confront a range of functional and regional threats, including long-standing challenges posed by illicit drug trafficking, other forms of TOC, and transnational terrorism financed by illicit means.

These priorities, listed below in order of precedence, address the issue of competing requirements by focusing DoD attention on high-priority missions funded by the Department's Drug Interdiction and Counterdrug Appropriation while emphasizing strategic analysis and global coverage. DoD Components should use these priorities as a guide when developing and prioritizing activities designed to attain the ways and use the means listed further below. For some activities, depending on the nature of the activity and the authority used, DoD may have a lead or supporting role. The order and composition of these priorities may require adjustment over the next five years to respond to challenges posed by the dynamic strategic landscape.


- 1. Support efforts to sever VEOs and TCOs' sources of strength, including funding and supply chains, with a focus on ISIS, al-Qaeda, and Iran-affiliated organizations.**
- 2. Disrupt and degrade the flow of heroin, fentanyl, and amphetamine-type like stimulants, chiefly from Mexico, by fusing intelligence and disrupting links among drug trafficking and transnational criminal organizations, with a focus on the Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco New Generation Cartel networks.**
- 3. Disrupt and degrade the flow of Afghan heroin supporting terrorist and criminal groups, focused on the Taliban/Haqqani network, and the downstream illicit drug trade through East Africa by supporting partner-nation law enforcement agencies' ability to conduct land and maritime counterdrug and counter transnational organized crime operations.**
- 4. Build Colombia and Peru's capacities to detect and interdict illicit trafficking, including drugs, precursor chemicals, and profits.**
- 5. Support interagency partners in stopping the flow of fentanyl from China and elsewhere into the United States, Mexico, and Central America, and degrade the unlawful diversion and smuggling of chemical precursors from Asia to the Western Hemisphere.**
- 6. Promote stability in Central America and the Dominican Republic through enhanced security across the air, land, and maritime domains to improve foreign partners' abilities to degrade drug trafficking and other illicit threat networks.**
- 7. Disrupt illicit trafficking and related criminal networks that threaten European and Asian security by working with U.S. and foreign law enforcement and security services, focusing on Russian and Chinese affiliated TCOs.**
- 8. Support interagency and law enforcement partners in order to disrupt North Korean efforts to circumvent sanctions compliance and utilize illicit financial activities.**

### **Component Priorities**

In addition to these priorities, Combatant Commands (CCMDs) and Defense Agencies may choose to establish supplemental component priorities to address additional mid-tier-level threats relevant to their geographic or functional oversight areas. Components may use those

supplemental priorities, in conjunction with these priorities, to support Counterdrug Program Objective Memoranda, support security cooperation requests, and measure program performance and effectiveness. In planning for the use of counterdrug resources, DoD Components will need to balance support for additional CTOC efforts against existing priorities.

The following ways and means (Figure 3) are mutually supporting and mirror DoD’s overall security strategy to protect the United States, deter adversaries, enable U.S. and foreign law enforcement and security counterparts, and counter terrorism. Due to the amorphous and resilient nature of illicit threat networks, terms like *victory and conquest*, traditionally used to define military success, fail to describe attainable end-states when addressing counterdrug or CTOC objectives. This *Framework for Countering Drug Trafficking and Other Illicit Threat Networks* places emphasis on intelligence, information sharing, and operational support to U.S. and international partners.



**Figure 3: Strategic Foundation**

## Objectives

*DISRUPT AND  
DEGRADE THREAT  
NETWORKS*

**Illicit threat networks lose the capacity to conduct sustained operations or activities.**

DoD will employ intelligence and operational capabilities in support of U.S. and international efforts to target, disrupt, and degrade illicit threat networks that pose the greatest threat to U.S. national and global security. By targeting illicit networks’ operational and financial key nodes

and linkages, DoD support may help disrupt these networks and their activities before they can threaten U.S. national security.

*REDUCE DRUG  
TRAFFICKING AND  
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY*

**Fewer illicit drugs enter U.S. markets, and other forms of transnational criminal activity decline.**

DoD will support and enable U.S. and foreign partner efforts to reduce drug trafficking and other forms of transnational criminal activity. By serving as the lead U.S. agency for detecting and monitoring the aerial and maritime transit of illicit drugs into the United States, and by sharing intelligence and domain awareness information to domestic and foreign law enforcement partners, DoD will help reduce the quantity of illicit drugs reaching the United States and degrade global criminal activity.

*STRENGTHEN  
PARTNERS*

**U.S. and international partners strengthen their combined efforts to combat drug trafficking and other illicit threat networks.**

DoD will leverage its capabilities to support interagency efforts; and to assist foreign partners by building their capabilities and capacities to conduct independent and integrated operations against illicit drug trafficking and other forms of transnational organized crime. DoD will place special emphasis on training and equipping programs designed to benefit partner nations that can sustain capacity-building efforts focused on countering illicit threat networks.

These three ways are reinforced, supported, or otherwise enabled through the pursuit of the following ways.

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## *Ways*

The ways describe how DoD will work toward achieving the end-state and objectives and serve to guide DoD domestic and international efforts in the areas of strategy and plans development, domain awareness capabilities, building partnership capacity, intelligence and information sharing, and operational support.

These ways are further linked by *lines of effort*. Although the examples are not exclusive, these lines of effort represent the types of programs and activities that DoD may undertake to link multiple tasks and missions.

### **1. Strategy and Plans**

*DoD develops, synchronizes, and implements doctrine, strategies, plans, and programs to facilitate and support operations with U.S. and international partners.* DoD will implement policies and processes to improve synergy among U.S. and international partners by encouraging greater collaboration in the development of doctrine, plans, and programs that support combined

and joint operations. Although individual agencies or countries may possess intelligence or operational capability to combat illicit networks, many cannot support full-spectrum operations due to authority limitations and resource constraints. DoD and its partners can design mutually reinforcing plans and programs to exploit strengths and mitigate weaknesses, resulting in increased net effectiveness and unity of effort.

**Supporting Lines of Effort:**

- a. Integrate CIDT, counter-threat finance (CTF), and other counter-illicit threat network objectives into DoD strategies and plans, such as CCMD campaign plans, to ensure functional and regional alignment.
- b. Develop and maintain plans for the use of capabilities such as domain awareness, intelligence sharing, and threat finance intelligence (TFI) in support of current and future contingency operations.
- c. Develop plans and programs to enable U.S. Government and international partners to address air, maritime, and riverine threats, including illicit trafficking and maritime piracy, in the most susceptible regions.
- d. Coordinate plans, programs, activities, and investments to maximize desired effects to counter illicit trafficking (CIT) and the criminal links to VEOs while reducing seams between regions and minimizing duplication of effort.
- e. Support the planning efforts of other U.S. departments and agencies and foreign security forces to disrupt illicit threat networks and activities such as illicit financial flows, pathways, infrastructure, commodities, and facilitators.

## **2. Intelligence and Information Sharing**

*DoD conducts intelligence and information-sharing activities to support partner activities to detect, disrupt, degrade, and disable illicit drug trafficking and other forms of transnational organized crime.* DoD will employ the authorities and capabilities of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE) and DoD detection and monitoring assets to identify the flows of illicit drugs, precursor chemicals, and financial and logistical mechanisms used to support illicit drug production and distribution. By synchronizing activities across CCMD boundaries, DoD will support U.S. and international efforts to locate and track key TCOs, networks, and facilitators to identify their strengths, weaknesses, enablers, and operational centers of gravity. DoD will leverage its authorities to support the disruption of illicit threat networks that engage in the trafficking of money, human trafficking, illicit financial flows, illegal trade in natural resources and wildlife, trade in illegal drugs and weapons, and other forms of illegal means as determined by the Secretary of Defense.<sup>5</sup>

**Supporting Lines of Effort:**

- a. Monitor<sup>6</sup> key geographic regions to identify trends, to facilitate targeting, to prevent strategic surprise, and to mitigate risks posed by illicit drug traffickers and other transnational criminal organizations that challenge U.S. security and contribute to regional instability.

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<sup>5</sup> See Section 1022 of the NDAA for FY 2004, as amended (10 U.S.C. 271 note).

<sup>6</sup> For the purpose of this framework, “monitor” means maintaining situational awareness through collaboration with U.S. Government and international partners, intelligence collection/analysis, information sharing, intelligence sharing, or other means.

- b. Identify, illuminate, and map the network intersections between state and non-state actors, focused on vulnerabilities and key nodes to sever state-crime alliances in the areas of cybercrime, illicit finance, and use of proxies.
- c. Integrate efforts and plans with U.S. Government and international partners that support the identification and prioritization of the most dangerous TCO networks through opportunity and impact analysis.
- d. Provide tailored intelligence analysis at the theater level or below to mission partners in support of U.S. and foreign partner action against global illicit drug, terrorist, and TCO networks.
- e. Develop a strategic common intelligence picture (CIP) for illicit drug distribution, trafficking, and supporting networks; identify drug trafficking organization business models and key nodes to exploit and inject risk into traffickers' operations.
- f. Synchronize activities across Combatant Command boundaries to support U.S. and international efforts to locate and track key TCOs, networks, and facilitators to identify their strengths, weaknesses, enablers, and operational centers of gravity.
- g. Capitalize on existing infrastructure, protocols, and procedures or develop and deploy new tools to allow for the authorized sharing of DoD, law enforcement, and foreign partner nation intelligence and information to enhance regional security institutions' capabilities to support regional security initiatives.
- h. Support authorized activities to leverage, in accordance with legal, regulatory, and policy restrictions, open-source information, including that obtainable from the private sector, academia, social media, and other publicly-available sources.
- i. Support efforts to integrate more effectively illicit threat network information that enters or resides within existing DoD CIDT and CTOC fusion centers and task forces.

### 3. Operational Support

*DoD supports and enables U.S. and international partners to disrupt and disable illicit threat networks by targeting the networks' leadership, operations, logistics, communications, finances, and key facilitators.* DoD will support and enable U.S. and international efforts to target the operations, finances, and communications of drug-trafficking and other illicit threat networks with the intent of disrupting or degrading their operations. In cooperation with U.S. Government and foreign partners, DoD will support programs and activities designed to deny drug trafficking organizations and other TCOs the use of territory, airspace, and surrounding sea lines of communication, and to counter the effects of money laundering and other threat finance activities.

#### Supporting Lines of Effort

- a. Target<sup>7</sup> the financial nodes and capital facilitators of priority drug and other illicit trafficking organizations in support of U.S. contingency operations, ongoing DoD CIDT and related CIT efforts, and U.S. and partner-nation law enforcement and security forces activities.
- b. Support and enable U.S. and international efforts to target operations, finances, and communications of drug trafficking and other illicit threat networks with the intent of disrupting or degrading their operations.

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<sup>7</sup> For the purpose of this framework, target means to direct an intelligence action at a particular country, area, installation, agency, person, or group.

- c. Degrade the flow of illicit contraband and proceeds, including but not limited to illicit drugs, drug precursors, trafficked persons, wildlife and natural resources, bulk cash, weapons, and other forms of illegal means as determined by the Secretary of Defense.
- d. Build and sustain relationships with key countries and regions via programs and activities designed to strengthen regional counter-trafficking cooperation and interoperability, and by encouraging partner participation in multilateral fora, exchanges, and security dialogues of mutual interest.

#### 4. Domain Awareness

*DoD will collect, integrate, and analyze surveillance, intelligence, and all-source information, and will share this information among U.S. and international partners in order to make decisions or operate effectively to identify and target illicit drug trafficking and other illicit threat networks.* DoD will invest resources and implement programs to gather, aggregate, and share intelligence information with allies and partners to improve awareness and understanding of illicit network operations and financing activities. Through the DIE, DoD will contribute to the development and maintenance of a common intelligence picture to help identify emerging, expanding, and shifting threats and their relationships with vulnerable nations and regions. In support of developing more effective U.S. Government responses, DoD will share information and intelligence with U.S. Government and foreign partners to the maximum extent allowable by law, and expand information-sharing agreements and arrangements and technical solutions to be able to anticipate future illicit threat network activities.

##### Supporting Lines of Effort

- a. Focus physical and intelligence domain awareness capabilities on major illicit drug production regions, transit routes, and drug precursor trafficking, with an emphasis on supporting the identification and disruption of threat networks, key actors, and critical logistics nodes.<sup>8</sup>
- b. Collect, analyze, fuse, and disseminate domain awareness data and intelligence collected by authorized units across the DIE to develop a common DoD intelligence picture to support contingency operations and ongoing CIDT, CTF, and other counter-illicit threat network activities.<sup>9</sup>
- c. Shape the operational environment through direct and indirect support activities to identify and isolate drug trafficking organizations' (DTOs')/TCOs' networks and enablers, denying them access to key terrain, safe havens, and critical capabilities.
- d. Share ways to leverage advances in research and development technologies that address current gaps in drug detection at border crossings (including tunneling detection), in commercial shipments, and in the U.S. Postal System.
- e. Employ big-data analytics to support detection and monitoring in order to enhance the authorized intelligence-driven use of existing capabilities and resources.

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<sup>8</sup> For example, identification of suspicious cargo, vessels, aircraft, persons, corporations, entities, networks, and affiliations.

<sup>9</sup> In accordance with DoD Manual 5240 1-R, "Procedures Governing the Conduct of DoD Intelligence Activities," August 8, 2016.

- f. Support authorized DoD cybersecurity and cyber operations pertaining to whole-of-government efforts to deny TCOs and other illicit threat network actors the ability to develop and employ cybercrime against U.S. national security interests.

## 5. Capacity Building

*DoD assists foreign partners to improve their capability and capacity to disrupt and degrade illicit drug trafficking, transnational organized crime, and other illicit threat networks.* In cooperation with U.S. Government partners, DoD may invest, as authorized by law, in programs and activities designed to build the capability and capacity of select international partners to disrupt and degrade drug trafficking and other transnational criminal organizations the use of their territory, airspace, and surrounding sea lines of communication; counter the effects of money laundering and other threat finance activities; and work together with key regional allies and other partners to share expertise and train other countries.

### Supporting Lines of Effort

- a. Design and implement, in collaboration with U.S. Government and international partners, capacity-building strategies to build strong and capable partners by employing an optimal mix of training, equipping, operational support, and leadership mentoring in collaboration with U.S. Embassy country teams.
- b. Improve the capability and capacity of partner nations' national security forces and, when authorized, their law enforcement agencies to disrupt and degrade the nexus among drug and other illicit traffickers, threat finance networks, foreign terrorist organizations, and insurgency movements.
- c. Support U.S. Government partner efforts to build the CTF and TFI capabilities of international partners' defense, security, and law enforcement services to recognize and disrupt threat networks' use of illicit proceeds and exploitation of worldwide interbank financial telecommunications.
- d. Strengthen partner-nation maritime, air, land, and cyber domain awareness and interdiction capabilities by building the capability and capacity of military forces, border security services, and law enforcement agencies to monitor, patrol, and perform CIDT and other CIT operations successfully.
- e. Enhance partner nation defense and security forces' mobility and logistics capabilities to conduct maritime, riverine, air, and land CIT operations.
- f. Assist capable partner nations in exporting security cooperation capabilities and expertise to other countries in support of regional CIDT, CTF, and counter illicit threat network efforts.





Dili, Timor-Leste (Aug. 4, 2016) - U.S. Navy Master-at-Arms 2nd Class Carson Jones, assigned to Coastal Riverine Group 1, reviews evidence collection procedures with Força Defesa Timor-Leste service members during Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) Timor-Leste 2016. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Lowell Whitman)

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## *Implementing the Framework (Means)*

**Policy Guidance and Joint Doctrine.** In addition to complementing and supporting previously-cited national and DoD strategies, this *Framework* will be supported by DoD and Joint Staff Directives and Instructions that will prescribe policies governing DoD efforts to counter drug trafficking and other illicit threat networks, including efforts to counter threat financing. This framework supports and complements military joint doctrine in relevant doctrinal publications, including: Joint Publication (JP) JP 3-07.4, *Counterdrug Operations*; JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*; JP 3-05, *Special Operations*, JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*; JP 3-25 *Countering Threat Networks*; JP 3-26 *Counterterrorism*, and JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*.

**Component Implementation Plans.** The key to implementing this *Framework to Counter Drug Trafficking and Other Illicit Threat Networks* is found where the *Framework's* Ways intersect its Priorities. CCMDs and Defense Agencies that participate in Future Years Defense Program development directed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats, and supervised by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict, will develop implementation plans linking the ways listed above to the previously identified priorities (Figure 4).

These plans need not be separately written plans but may be embedded within existing command, service, and agency plans, such as Theater Campaign Plans, Campaign Support Plans, Country Specific Security Cooperation Sections, Capacity Development Plans, etc.

Implementation plans will provide strategic context for program development and guide component investment in cross-cutting initiatives to bridge geographic and functional seams. Supporting programs and activities should be designed to complement and reinforce the framework’s end-state, priorities, and ways. DoD Components may propose supplemental CCMD or agency priorities to highlight additional areas of geographic or functional interest. In rare instances, a program or activity may not support one of the *Framework’s* priorities and may only link to one of its ways.

		Ways				
		1	2	3	4	5
<b>COMPONENT IMPLEMENTATION PLANS</b>						
<b>Priorities</b>	Pri 1		DoD conducts intelligence and information-sharing activities to support partner activities to detect, disrupt, degrade and disable illicit drug trafficking and other forms of transnational organized crime.		DoD will collect, integrate, and analyze surveillance, intelligence, and any-source information, and will share this information among U.S. and international partners in order to make decisions or operate effectively to identify and target illicit drug trafficking and other illicit threat networks.	
	Pri 2					
	Pri 3					
	Pri 4	4. Build Colombia and Peru's capacities to detect and interdict illicit trafficking, including drugs, precursor chemicals, and profits.				
	Pri 5					
	Pri 6					
	Pri 7					
	Pri 8					
<b>Supplemental Component Priorities</b>	C1	Improve _____ region partners' capabilities to exploit shared information in the targeting of _____ networks.				
	C2					
	C3					

*Example 1:*  
Programs and activities in support of Priority 4, via Objective 2.

*Example 2:*  
Programs and activities in support of Supplemental Component Priority 1, via Objective 4.

**Figure 4: Priorities/Ways Matrix**

**Resources.** The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Counternarcotics and Global Threats (CN&GT), under the authority, direction, and control of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC), and at the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, is responsible for policy and oversight of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process as it pertains to the DoD CIDT and

CTOC efforts identified within this *Framework*. The Director, DSCA, is responsible for the PPBE process as it pertains to CIDT and CTOC efforts undertaken under Section 333.

The CIDT and CTOC mission areas that receive resources reflect where DoD's capabilities will provide the highest impact on threats posed by illicit drug trafficking and other illicit threat networks, while at the same time contributing to overseas contingency operations and enhancing U.S. national security. The CN&GT office will evaluate DoD's efforts continually, based upon the priorities identified in this *Framework*, the changing nature of illicit trafficking threats, and participating nations' requirements.

**Funding.** Congress appropriates resources for the bulk of these efforts to the DoD under the title of "Drug Interdiction and Counterdrug Activities, Defense." DoD manages this appropriation through the Counterdrug (CD) Central Transfer Account, established by Program Budget Decision (PBD) 678 in November 1989. The CN&GT office initiates actions to reprogram funds from the CTA to the DoD Components in the year of execution. In planning for the future, Components must prioritize and balance resources among various lines of effort and towards programs and activities that provide the greatest benefits for a given cost. DoD will continue to leverage its appropriations in collaboration with U.S. Government partners to maximize efficiency and impact from efforts financed by U.S. Government resources.

DoD funds security cooperation programs and activities with amounts budgeted and provided to DSCA for such purposes. Separate security cooperation guidance outlines the process, planning, administration, execution, and management guidance for CIDT, CTOC, and maritime and border security training and equipping programs executed under Chapter 16 of Title 10, U.S. Code.<sup>10</sup>

**Measuring Performance.** In addition to providing a framework for strategic investment and program development, this *Framework's* objectives and lines of effort support the means to evaluate tactical- and operational-level performance and effectiveness. Components will develop performance metrics to measure the absolute and relative success of programs and activities in the context of the *Framework's* end-state, priorities, and ways. By continuously evaluating performance and effectiveness, Components will improve investment and program decisions within the CD PPBE process. Feedback from performance processes will help guide DoD policymakers in making key resource and management decisions and will inform the development of future policy, programs, and activities. Annex A describes this *Framework's* performance measurement philosophy and approach.

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<sup>10</sup> 10 U.S.C. § 333 lists support for several types of programs including counterterrorism, counter-weapons of mass destruction, CIDT, CTOC, maritime and border security, military intelligence operations, and operations or activities that contribute to an international operation that is determined by the Secretary of Defense to be in the national interest of the United States.

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A U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawk takes off with Honduran soldiers and their equipment, Nov. 5, 2015, in the Gracias a Dios department (state) of Honduras. The helicopters, assigned to the 1-228th Aviation Regiment at Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras, fulfilled a Honduran military request for airlift to aid in their freedom of movement in the area, helping them to combat drug trafficking and related criminal activities. (U.S. Air Force photo by Capt. Christopher J. Mesnard)



## III. Glossary

### *Part I—Abbreviations and Acronyms*

CCMD	combatant command
CD	counterdrug
CIDT	counter-illicit drug trafficking
CIT	counter illicit trafficking
CN	counternarcotics
CTA	central transfer account
CTF	counter-threat finance
CT	counterterrorism
CTOC	counter-transnational organized crime
DIE	Defense Intelligence Enterprise
DTO	drug trafficking organization
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NDCS	National Drug Control Strategy
PPBE	Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
SO/LIC	Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict
TCO	transnational criminal organization
TFI	threat finance intelligence
TOC	transnational organized crime
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
U.S.C.	United States Code

## *Part II—Terms and Definitions*

The terms and definitions listed below are specific for the purposes of this *Framework* and not necessarily intended for inclusion in the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

**arms trafficking (or weapons trafficking)** – The illegal diversion of any quantity of firearms from the legal market or any illegal commerce in firearms. (U.S. Department of Justice)

**campaign plan** – See JP 5-0.

**common intelligence picture** – a single, coordinated intelligence picture by fusing national and theater intelligence into all-source estimates and assessments. (The intelligence portion of the common operational picture). **Also called CIP.**

**common operational picture** - a single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command that facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness. **Also called COP.** Source: JP 3-0

**counter-drug** – Those active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. Also called CD and counternarcotics (CN). (JP 1-02)

**counter-drug activities** – Those measures taken to detect and monitor, interdict, disrupt, or curtail any activity that is reasonably related to illicit drug trafficking. (JP 1-02)

**counter-drug operational support** – Support to host nations and drug law enforcement agencies involving military personnel and their associated equipment, provided by the geographic Combatant Commanders from forces assigned to them or made available to them by the Services for this purpose. See **counter-drug operations**. (JP 1-02)

**counter-drug operations** – Civil or military actions taken to reduce or eliminate illicit drug trafficking. See counter-drug; counter-drug operational support. (JP 1-02)

**counter illicit trafficking** – See **counter transnational organized crime**.

**countering threat networks** – The aggregation of activities across the Department of Defense and U.S. Government departments and agencies that identifies and neutralizes, degrades, disrupts, or defeats designated threat networks. Also called CTN. (JP 3-25)

**counterterrorism** – See JP 1-02.

**counter threat finance** – Activities conducted to deny, disrupt, destroy, or defeat the generation, storage, movement, and use of assets to fund activities that support an adversary's ability to negatively affect U.S. interests. (JP 1-02)

**counter transnational organized crime** – Activities to detect, monitor, disrupt, interdict, or degrade transnational criminal organizations and networks trafficking in, or deriving support or resources from, illicit drugs, weapons, natural resources, wildlife, or people that threaten U.S. interests or cause instability to regional partners. **(This term and its definition are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Publication 1-02.)**

**defense intelligence enterprise** – The intelligence combat support agencies, the intelligence elements of the Military Services and Combatant Commands, and DoD intelligence, counterintelligence, and security organizations (e.g., Defense Security Service). (DoDI 3020.51)

**degrade** – Temporarily reduce the effectiveness or efficiency of drug trafficking and transnational criminal organizations (DTOs/TCOs) systems, efforts, or means. DTOs/TCOs are unable to function as a global organization and regress into groups whose expansion is held in check by local and regional security forces, law enforcement, or other element of national power.

**deny** – Hinder or prevent DTOs/TCOs from using terrain, illicit finances, logistics, safe havens, materials, and services in order to allow U.S. law enforcement and criminal prosecution agencies, in partnership with foreign law enforcement agencies and foreign military forces to target criminal assets and exploit opportunities to reduce profitability and growth. The duration of denial will depend on the DTOs/TCOs ability to reconstitute.

**detection and monitoring** – *(as authorized by 10 U.S.C. § 124)*. The operation of DoD equipment by DoD personnel to intercept a vessel or an aircraft detected outside the land area of the United States for the purposes of identifying and communicating with that vessel or aircraft; and directing that vessel or aircraft to go to a location designated by appropriate civilian officials. (10 U.S.C. § 124)

**detection and monitoring** – *(as authorized by 10 U.S.C. § 284)*. The detection, monitoring, and communication of the movement of air and sea traffic within 25 miles of and outside the geographic boundaries of the United States; and surface traffic outside the geographic boundary of the United States and within the United States, not to exceed 25 miles of the boundary if the initial detection occurred outside of the boundary. (10 U.S.C. § 284)

**disrupt** – Temporarily interrupt or reduce the effectiveness or efficiency of an illicit network or activity e.g., the bulk transportation of illicit drugs or other contraband, chemical precursors, the financial proceeds of illicit trade, the detention, arrest, or seizure of suspects and evidentiary items.

**domain awareness** – understanding how domains operate and interact within their environment and how they may impact the security and safety of the United States. A domain can be either physical, i.e., maritime domain of a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, or conceptual, i.e., cyber domain of networked systems.

**drug interdiction** – A continuum of events focused on interrupting illegal drugs smuggled by air, sea, or land. See also **counter-drug operations**. (JP 1-02)

**human smuggling** – The facilitation, transportation, attempted transportation, or illegal entry of a person or persons across an international border, in violation of one or more countries' laws, either clandestinely or through deception, whether with the use of fraudulent documents or through the evasion of legitimate border controls. (U.S. Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime)

**human trafficking** – See **trafficking in persons**.

**illicit finance** – the financing of terrorism, narcotics trafficking, or proliferation, money laundering, or other forms of illicit financing domestically or internationally, as defined by the

President. Source: Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, Public Law 115-44, August 2, 2017

**illicit trafficking** – The illegal trading, selling, or dealing in specified goods, both across borders or within a country. (This term and its definition are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Publication 1-02.)

**illicit threat network** – A threat network with a primarily criminal purpose. See also **threat network**.

**intelligence activities** – All activities that the DoD Components conduct pursuant to Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," December 4, 1981, as amended. Source: DoD Manual 5240.01

**line of effort** – See JP 1-02.

**money laundering** – Any act or attempted act to conceal or disguise the identity of illegally obtained proceeds so that they appear to have originated from legitimate sources. (INTERPOL)

**monitor** – Maintaining situational awareness through collaboration with U.S. Government and international partners, intelligence collection/analysis, information sharing, intelligence sharing, or other means.

**narcoterrorism** – Terrorism that is linked to illicit drug trafficking. (JP 1-02)

**target** – In intelligence usage, a country, area, installation, agency, or person against which intelligence operations are directed.

**terrorism** – See JP 1-02.

**threat finance intelligence** – See DoDD 5205.14, DoD Counter Threat Finance Policy.

**threat network** – A group of people interconnected via formal or informal associations; consisting of various combinations of criminals, terrorists, insurgents, State or non-State actors, enablers, or supporters; whose size, scope, capabilities, actions, or intent pose a threat to U.S. national security or interests. **(This term and its definition are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Publication 1-02.)**

**trafficking in persons** – The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power, or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation includes, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude, or the removal of organs. (UNODC)

**transnational organized crime** – Refers to self-perpetuating associations of individuals who operate transnationally for the purpose of obtaining power, influence, or monetary or commercial gains, wholly or in part by illegal means, while protecting their activities through a pattern of corruption or violence or through a transnational organization structure and the exploitation of



transnational commerce or communication mechanisms. (U.S. Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime)

**transnational threats** – Any activity, individual, or group not tied to a particular country or region that operates across international boundaries and threatens U.S. national security or interests. (JP 1-02)

**weapons trafficking** – See **arms trafficking**.

**wildlife trafficking** – The poaching or other taking of protected or managed species and the illegal trade in wildlife and their related parts and products. (National Strategy for Combating Wildlife Trafficking)

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## IV. Annexes

The 612th U.S. Air and Space Operations Center provides command and control of U.S. air and space power in U.S. Southern Command's area of responsibility. The facility, which spans 26,750 feet, operates 24 hours a day to support joint and coalition efforts in the Caribbean, Central America, and South America. U.S. (Air Force photo by Capt. Justin Brockhoff)

### *Annex A: Measuring Performance<sup>11</sup>*

DoD provides global support to U.S. and partner efforts to disrupt drug trafficking and other illicit threat networks. A robust performance measurement program provides component commanders, agency directors, and others charged with implementing this *Framework* a means to measure progress toward achieving the desired end-state and objectives. By continuously assessing program *performance* and *effectiveness*, DoD can focus on those activities that maximize resources while delivering the best results. Feedback obtained from the performance measurement process becomes the basis for learning, adaptation, and subsequent adjustment. Effective assessment requires criteria, or metrics, for evaluating the degree of success in accomplishing the mission.

As a general rule, the level at which a specific operation, task, or action occurs should be the level at which an activity is assessed. This provides assessment at each level and enhances the efficiency of the overall measurement process. In selecting metrics, Components should focus on those that most accurately represent the tasks they perform and the progress they achieve toward the desired end-states. More complex programs will require more complex assessments and should include metrics for performance and effectiveness for each program or activity.

*DoD will use Performance Measurement to:*

- **Support the selection of courses of action related to program lifecycle decisions.**
- **Support the DoD Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process for DoD activities funded through the Counterdrug (CD) Appropriation.**
- **Improve program management and oversight at all levels.**
- **Facilitate communications and engagement with internal and external stakeholders.**

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<sup>11</sup> See DoD Instruction 5132.14 for guidance specific to measuring the performance of DoD security cooperation activities under 10 U.S.C., Chapter 16.

## Performance Measurement Program Benefits

CCMDs and Defense Agencies are responsible for developing, managing, and reporting activities funded through DoD's CD appropriation via a formal performance measurement program. An effective program provides leadership and program managers with several benefits:

- **Aligns programs and initiatives with strategic priorities and objectives:** Effective metrics capture and measure cause-and-effect linkages among existing and proposed activities and measure progress toward achieving desired end-states.
- **Links program performance to management and investment decisions:** Effective metrics provide stakeholders with key output data that may be used to evaluate the performance of programs and supporting organizations, and identify opportunities for investment.
- **Identifies opportunities for improvement early:** Effective metrics identify gaps in program performance and pinpoint areas where interim results indicate a failure to meet intermediate expectations. Identifying areas that require improvement early in a process helps avoid expending resources on underperforming programs.
- **Frames stakeholder expectations:** Programs aligned with this *Framework* will support and enable related missions performed by U.S. Government and international partners. Effective metrics help frame program expectations in support of common strategic stakeholder objectives.
- **Supports program execution and development:** A successful program provides DoD with valuable data regarding the performance and effectiveness of a framework's supporting elements. DoD leadership may then draw conclusions from the analysis of this data and use those conclusions to support program execution and out-year decisions.

## Program Management Support

A successful performance measurement program will help ensure that Component and subcomponent objectives, programs, and activities align with and support this *Framework* and the following management imperatives:

- **Strategic Integration:** In addition to supporting mission execution at the tactical and operational levels, metrics must support the objectives of this *Framework* and objectives identified in component Campaign Plans and similar operational-level documents.
- **Mission Execution:** Effective metrics support mission execution by defining the parameters of mission success and by measuring progress toward objectives. Once programs reach the execution stage, properly developed output and outcome metrics will help keep programs on course to achieve desired end-states.
- **Operational Efficiency:** Metrics support program efficiency by helping identify initiatives and activities with the highest projected return on investment (most effective at achieving program objectives at lowest cost). Components should employ metrics to inform program reviews, guide procurement decisions, and identify opportunities for process improvement.
- **Policy Compliance:** Effective performance measurement ensures Components support DoD policies by providing a means to monitor activities for policy compliance continuously. Metrics to support compliance should be incorporated into the management oversight program of every Component.
- **Reporting:** DoD will employ metrics to catalog and report Component performance toward achieving this *Framework's* goals and objectives. Components will measure and report annual performance in accordance with guidance issued by the DASD (CN&GT).

## *Annex B: Authorities*

In this *Framework to Counter Drug Trafficking and Other Illicit Threat Networks*, DoD has identified illicit trafficking by TCOs as an evolving U.S. national security threat that requires whole-of-government solutions. Whereas the *Framework* recognizes that dramatic changes in the global security environment call for new approaches, this document provides strategic guidance in accordance with existing statutory authorities. As DoD's understanding of these transnational threats continues to evolve, DoD authorities may require revision or amendment.

The primary authorities under which DoD conducts activities in support this framework include:

- 10 U.S.C. § 124, "Detection and Monitoring of Aerial and Maritime Transit of Illegal Drugs."
- 10 U.S.C. § 284, "Support for Counterdrug Activities and Activities to Counter Transnational Organized Crime." CD and CTOC support to departments or agencies of the Federal Government or of any State, local, tribal, or foreign law enforcement agency.
- 10 U.S.C. § 333, "Foreign Security Forces – Authority to Build Capacity." CIDT and CTOC support to foreign partners, including the provision and sustainment of defense articles, training, defense services, supplies (including consumables), and small-scale construction.
- 32 U.S.C. § 112 "Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities."
- Section 1021, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (as amended), "Authority to support a unified Counterdrug and Counterterrorism Campaign in Colombia."
- Section 1022, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (as amended, extended, and restated), "Authority for Joint Task Forces to Support Law Enforcement Agencies Conducting Counterterrorism Activities." (Note: Section 1022 also provides authority for joint task forces to support law enforcement agencies conducting activities to counter transnational organized crime.

